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INTRODUCTION
With respect to the protections afforded by the Geneva Conventions,1
a great deal of ink has been spilled in recent years over the two-tiered
system of tribunals employed by the United States in its prosecution of
enemy combatants in the “war on terror.”2 Less discussed, though, is the
wholly separate two-tiered system for sorting violators of the Geneva Con-
ventions that emerges from the very text of those agreements. This stratifi-
cation is a function of the Conventions’ distinction between those who
commit “grave breaches” and those who merely commit “acts contrary to
* J.D., University of Michigan Law School, 2013; M.S., International Relations, Troy
University, 2009; B.S., Political Science, University of Maryland University College, 2007. I
owe a debt of gratitude for the input and help of my fellow editors, but especially Katie
Martin-Browne, John Whitaker, and Alex Link. I am also indebted to Professor Julian
Mortenson, whose suggestions helped me to rein in my less disciplined ambitions for this
Note. Finally, I’d like to thank my wife for her patience and support, without which the
production of this Note would have been tremendously painful.
1. Unless I refer to them individually, my references to the Geneva Conventions
throughout this Note are intended as shorthand for both the Conventions and Addition Pro-
tocol I, which is the only of the Additional Protocols technically to address grave breaches.
2. See, e.g., Legal Issues Regarding Individuals Detained by the Department of De-
fense as Unlawful Enemy Combatants: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Armed Services,
110th Cong. 37-48 (2007) (statement of Prof. Neal K. Katyal regarding legality and wisdom of
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the provisions of the present convention”3 or “all other breaches,”4 which
are also sometimes referred to as “simple breaches”5 or “minor
violations.”6
Relatively little has been written regarding these minor breaches; they
have typically been dismissed as “not important enough” to justify thor-
ough treatment.7 Although the original Conventions are clear that High
Contracting Parties are to “take measures necessary for the suppression of
all acts contrary to the provisions of the present Convention other than . . .
grave breaches,”8 no other mention of such other-than-grave breaches is
made within their text. In his authoritative commentary on the Geneva
Conventions, Jean Pictet—whom the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) has called the “main architect of the Geneva Conven-
tions”9—posits that the duty to suppress all breaches of the Conventions
requires High Contracting Parties to legislate enforcement mechanisms for
suppressing simple breaches;10 nevertheless, states parties that have taken
the extraordinary step of legislatively proscribing—let alone criminaliz-
ing—minor violations are rare enough that they remain notable excep-
tions from the mainstream of state practice.11
Irrespective of these presumed legislative duties regarding minor
breaches, there is a vital distinction made in the Conventions between the
3. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 129, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III].
4. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 86, Jun. 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 17512 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I].
5. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Repression of Breaches of the Geneva Conventions Under the
Draft Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 8 RUTGERS-CAM
L.J. 185, 195 (1977).
6. José Luis Fernández Flores, Repression of the Law of War Committed by Individu-
als, 31 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 247, 264 (1991).
7. See id. at 266 (“Simple breaches or minor violations have purposely not been ex-
pressly enumerated, because it was considered that they were not important enough to call
for universal jurisdiction and such a list would have been too long.”) (footnotes omitted).
8. See Geneva Convention III, supra note 3, art. 129 (emphasis added). R
9. Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross [ICRC], Henry Dunant Medals Awarded at Red
Cross Red Crescent Council of Delegates, ICRC RESOURCE CENTRE (Nov. 17, 2005), http://
www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/news-release/2009-and-earlier/council-delegates-
news-171105.htm.
10. ICRC, Commentary: Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field 368 (Dec. 30, 1952) (“It is thus clear that
all breaches of the present Convention should be repressed by national legislation. . . . Fur-
thermore . . . the authorities of the Contracting Parties should issue instructions in accor-
dance with the Convention . . . and arrange for judicial or disciplinary proceedings to be
taken in all cases of failure to comply with such instructions.”) [hereinafter Pictet]. But cf. id.
at 370 (“Violations of certain of the detailed provisions of the Geneva Conventions might
quite obviously be no more than offences of a minor or purely disciplinary nature, and there
could be no question of providing for universal measures of repression in their case.”).
11. Ireland’s Geneva Conventions Act of 1962 is such an exception. See Geneva Con-
ventions Act, 1962, (Act No. 11/1962) (Ir.), available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1962/
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jurisdiction granted for grave breaches and that granted for simple
breaches. Whereas the Conventions provide the basis for invoking univer-
sal jurisdiction—that is, jurisdiction to adjudicate and enforce violations
everywhere and at any time—over grave breaches12 (and probably for
other “serious violations,” if such a classification is distinct from grave
breaches),13 responsibility for the enforcement of minor breaches is un-
derstood to reside entirely with either the violator’s state or the state in
whose territory the breach occurred, if the accused is in that state’s cus-
tody.14 The fact that discretion to enforce and punish minor breaches
against individuals is left to the violator’s own national state, combined
with the fact that nearly all states parties have declined to exercise such
discretion through affirmative legislation,15 says something important
about the meaning of the Conventions with respect to these “other”
breaches.
Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), subse-
quent state practice with respect to a treaty’s application is an important
factor to be taken into consideration when interpreting that treaty’s provi-
sions.16 This means that, despite M. Pictet’s impression to the contrary,
widespread (or uniformly nonuniform) state practice in this area is more
likely an indicator of the Conventions’ meaning than a violation of their
terms. Thus, the absence of state practice confirming a legislative require-
ment (and significant practice implementing other modes of suppression)
suggests by way of positivist inference that most states, by and large, in-
tended not to be bound by such a requirement. States seem to interpret
12. See Roger O’Keefe, The Grave Breaches Regime and Universal Jurisdiction, 7 J.
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 811, 811–12 (2009) (“[T]he term ‘universal jurisdiction’ refers to the com-
petence of a state under international law to criminalize and, should the occasion arise, pros-
ecute conduct when no other internationally recognized prescriptive link—chief among them
territoriality, nationality, passive personality and the protective principle—exists at the time
of the alleged commission of the offence.”) (footnotes omitted). Universal jurisdiction of this
sort is sometimes characterized as a duty to prosecute, but it is more accurately framed as an
obligation to prosecute or extradite. See, e.g., Steven Ratner, War Crimes, Categories of, in
CRIMES OF WAR: WHAT THE PUBLIC SHOULD KNOW 374, 375 (Roy Gutman & David Rieff
eds., 1999). But as Professor Ratner notes, this does not necessarily mean that states have
lived up to this obligation. “The more pervasive pattern,” he writes, “is either mere adminis-
trative punishment or impunity.” Id. at 376.
13. For a discussion of this possible distinction in the context of war crimes more gen-
erally, see Summary Records of the 2107th Meeting, [1989] 1 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 73, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SR.2107 (arguing with respect to the Draft Code of Crimes Against Peace and
Security that it might be appropriate to expressly incorporate all “serious violations of the
rules of international law applicable in armed conflicts” into the definition of war crimes); id.
at 74 (“[I]t would be useful to draw upon the acts listed in article 147 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention in characterizing ‘grave breaches,’ even if the Special Rapporteur preferred to
use the expression ‘serious violations’ “).
14. RATNER, supra note 12, at 375. R
15. See discussion infra Part II.
16. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3)(b), May 27, 1980, 1155
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this duty as entailing some other manner of obligation.17 The key ques-
tions, then, are how states understand (and implement) this onus, and
what the implications are of a meaning induced from such practice. I pos-
tulate that, despite the near total absence of literature on this subject, the
nature—and prevalence—of nongrave breaches may have profound ef-
fects on the structure of international humanitarian law (IHL) as a whole.
In the hope of elucidating the answer to the questions above and dem-
onstrating the outsized importance of this breed of prohibitions, this Note
will proceed as follows. Part I describes the sorts of conduct that qualify as
minor breaches of the Geneva Conventions in an attempt to provide some
contours to this class of violations. Part II is a brief survey of state practice
with respect to these breaches, which demonstrates the high degree of va-
riability in the means employed for suppressing such breaches. Part III
then addresses the broader inquiry of what the duty to suppress “means”
in light of standard interpretative methods, but with especial attention to
state practice as an interpretative tool. Part IV asks what the implications
are of a duty to suppress nongrave breaches, so construed, and attempts to
provide some preliminary answers. Finally, I conclude the discussion by
attempting to frame the issue so as to spur further development of this
underexplored subject.
I. DEFINING “MINOR BREACHES” OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS
The character of international law has been described (perhaps gener-
ously) as “somewhat nebulous.”18 Nevertheless, the contours of most rules
of international law abiding within the haze of custom are at least well
enough explored that their essential natures remain only vaguely mysteri-
ous. With respect to IHL, this haze has partly been dissipated by explicit
codification in the Geneva Conventions.19 But accompanying this fairly
well-defined body of law there lurk taboos murkily defined even by the
standards of customary international law (CIL): other-than-grave
breaches. They are described almost entirely in the negative, which is to
say by what they are not. Like a cameo, simple breaches are defined in
relief. It thus makes sense to begin by defining the contents of the category
comprising the most serious offenses: grave breaches. Given the emphasis
placed on this category, “[i]t is, perhaps easier,” admitted Christopher
17. Positivism has been described as “summariz[ing] a range of theories that focus
upon describing the law as it is, backed up by effective sanctions, with reference to formal
criteria, independently of moral or ethical considerations.” Steven R. Ratner & Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Appraising the Methods of International Law: A Prospectus for Readers, 93 AM. J.
INT’L L. 291, 293 (1999). In other words, international law is, according to positivists, only
that which is “on the books.”
18. C. Lamb, Commentary, Repressions of Violations Part V: Enforcement and Appli-
cation, 9 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 341, 341 (1980).
19. IHL also comprises several other treaties and a significant body of custom. See
generally ICRC, What Is International Humanitarian Law? (July 31, 2004), http://www.icrc
.org/eng/assets/files/other/what_is_ihl.pdf (describing the constituents of IHL and enumerat-
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Lamb of the Australian Red Cross, “to speak of grave breaches than sim-
ply breaches.”20
Nevertheless, a brief survey of the entire field of breaches is war-
ranted. Although nongrave breaches are defined mostly in relief, it’s im-
portant to understand that they are carved from a certain finite universe of
norms.
The Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols spell out the
bulk of the legal strictures to which the conduct of warfare must conform
(that is, jus in bello).21 Each Convention relates to a particular subject
matter, each of which corresponds to a specific class of persons and prop-
erty protected by that particular Convention and prescribes the rules for
the treatment of that class. These classes of persons are, in the order of the
Conventions: wounded and sick members of armed forces in the field;22
wounded, sick, and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea;23 prison-
ers of war;24 and civilians.25 Additional Protocol I is addressed more
broadly to the treatment of victims of international armed conflict (IAC),
which means all the classes of persons covered by the original
conventions.26
Beyond those categories of protected persons, the Conventions’ pre-
scriptions span an ample gamut of activity, including, but not limited to,
the requirement of due process to protected persons under the power of a
state party,27 conditions for confining protected persons,28 care for the
bodies of the deceased,29 the requirement to provide free passage for
medical supplies,30 the forbiddance of certain targets,31 restrictions on the
20. Lamb, supra note 18, at 341. R
21. Numerous other agreements also restrict aspects of warfare such as the kinds of
weapons permitted. See, e.g., Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions of the Use of Cer-
tain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137; Protocol for the Prohibition of the
Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of
Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571.
22. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter
Geneva Convention I].
23. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85
[hereinafter Geneva Convention II].
24. Geneva Convention III, supra note 3. R
25. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV].
26. Additional Protocol I, supra note 4. R
27. Geneva Convention I, supra note 22, art. 3; Geneva Convention II, supra note 23, R
art. 50; Geneva Convention III, supra note 3, art. 129; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 26, R
art. 146.
28. Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 85. R
29. See, e.g., Geneva Convention III, supra note 3, art. 120. R
30. Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 69. R
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use of the protected emblems,32 the proscription of perfidy,33 and the ad-
ministration of occupied areas.34
It’s also important to note that, as jus in bello, the grave-breaches re-
gime is a body of law that applies exclusively to combatants and their
superiors during armed conflict. This is a vital consideration in any discus-
sion of grave breaches or of the Conventions’ prescribed duty to suppress
all violations because the grave-breaches regime does not contemplate
compliance by states with the implementation requirements of the Geneva
Conventions. Thus, although a total failure to undertake any measures to
suppress breaches of the Conventions might be a material breach accord-
ing to the VCLT, 35 it is not (and cannot be) itself a grave breach. Nor
does the literature describe a state’s failure to search for and prosecute
those accused of grave breaches as a grave breach itself. Such violation
may still result in state responsibility for an international wrong, but it is
not the same as a violation of the law of war.36 On a related point, if there
is no armed conflict, there can be no grave breach.37 And because the
grave-breaches regime applies only to international armed conflict (IAC),
this places an additional requirement on the finding that a grave breach
has occurred. 38 These distinctions should always be borne in mind.
These details provide a rough conversance with the outer perimeter of
what constitutes a breach of the Geneva Conventions. The Geneva Con-
ventions do not, however, define “minor breaches,” per se, or describe any
violation as “minor” or “simple.” This is, perhaps, an unsurprising omis-
sion. Given that the Geneva Conventions are intended to address the most
egregious violations arising from the most unavoidably uncivilized of all
systemic human practices—namely, war—the finer details of those of-
fenses not rising to the critical threshold of “grave” hardly seem of great
consequence. One might fairly question whether there can even be a “mi-
nor” crime in this context.39 It is this omission that requires resort to the
enumerated grave breaches.
Several of the grave breaches of the Conventions and Additional Pro-
tocol I are expressly laid out as such and are therefore, without qualifica-
tion, grave per se. Each of the Geneva Conventions defines as grave
breaches “willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biologi-
32. Id. art. 38.
33. Id. art. 37.
34. See, e.g., Geneva Convention I, supra note 22, art. 18. R
35. See VCLT, supra note 16, art. 60. R
36. RATNER, supra note 12, at 374-75. R
37. Id.
38. Id. at 375 (“The grave breaches provisions only apply in international armed con-
flicts; and they only apply to acts against so-called protected persons or during battlefield
activities.”). Needless to say, this means that some very grave breaches indeed (in the collo-
quial sense) may simply be defined away by the nature of the armed conflict.
39. See, e.g., Yves Sandoz, The History of the Grave Breaches Regime, 7 J. INT’L CRIM.
JUST. 657, 676 (2009) (“In short, it should not be possible to speak as one author did, of
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cal experiments, willfully causing great suffering [and] serious injury to
body or health.”40 Beyond this general prohibition, the Conventions also
classify as grave certain other breaches coinciding with the respective pur-
pose of each Convention. Thus, the First, Second, and Fourth Geneva
Conventions (Geneva Conventions I, II, and IV, respectively) forbid “ex-
tensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military
necessity41 and carried out unlawfully and wantonly,”42 and the Third Ge-
neva Convention (Geneva Convention III) names “compelling a prisoner
of war [POW] to serve in the forces of the hostile Power [and] willfully
depriving a prisoner of war of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed
in this Convention” as grave breaches.43 This includes subjecting protected
persons to “physical mutilation or to medical or scientific experiments of
any kind which are not justified by the medical, dental or hospital treat-
ment of the prisoner concerned and carried out in his interest.”44
40. See Geneva Convention I, supra note 22, art. 50; Geneva Convention II, supra R
note 23, art. 51; Geneva Convention III, supra note 3, art. 130; Geneva Convention IV, supra R
note 26, art. 147. R
41. “Military necessity” is defined as a “principle of warfare allowing coercive force to
achieve a desired end, as long as the force used is not more than is called for by the situa-
tion.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1083 (9th ed. 2009). Although the absence of military ne-
cessity seems to be an essential element of a grave breach arising under these articles,
military necessity is inherently proportional; destruction or appropriation so grossly dispro-
portionate to the advantage gained means that military necessity alone cannot be an affirma-
tive defense, notwithstanding the permissive understanding of necessity in this legal
discipline as compared to others, such as tort or criminal law.
42. See Geneva Convention I, supra note 22, art. 50; Geneva Convention II, supra R
note 23, art. 51; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 26, art. 147. R
43. Geneva Convention III, supra note 3, art. 130. Geneva Convention III also speci- R
fies that “[a]ny unlawful act or omission by the Detaining Power causing death or seriously
endangering the health of a prisoner of war in its custody is prohibited, and will be regarded
as a serious breach.” Geneva Convention III, supra note 3, art. 13 (emphasis added). This is R
the sole instance in the Conventions of reference to “serious breach,” but the commentators
are in nearly universal agreement that there is no distinction between these and those
breaches considered to be “grave.” See, e.g., Flores, supra note 6, at 264-65 (“Grave breaches, R
sometimes called ‘serious violations,’ are those which most seriously prejudice the basic inter-
ests protected by humanitarian law.”) (footnotes omitted). But cf. Toni Pfanner, Various
Mechanisms and Approaches for Implementing International Humanitarian Law and Protect-
ing and Assisting War Victims, 91 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 279, 285 n.34 (2009) (“However,
the expression ‘serious violation’ is to be taken in the ordinary sense, which is left to the
[appreciation of the International Fact-Finding] Commission [established by Additional Pro-
tocol I].”).
44. Geneva Convention III, supra note 3, art. 13. These are among those affronts de- R
scribed as “serious violations.” Note also the clause that follows: “Likewise, prisoners of war
must at all times be protected, particularly against acts of violence or intimidation and against
insults and public curiosity. Measures of reprisal against prisoners of war are prohibited.”
The “[l]ikewise,” however, seems to refer only to the absolute character of the prohibition,
but does not necessarily import to that prohibition the label of “serious violation.” Thus, one
fair reading of this clause is that it does not spell out grave breaches. Nevertheless, M. Pictet,
for one, interpreted these offenses as falling within the meaning of “inhumane treatment,”
which is itself a grave breach. See PICTET, supra note 10, at 137. M. Pictet, of course, was not R
a state party to the Conventions, so despite his authority, it is unclear whether his broad view
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Additional Protocol I clarifies that the category of grave breaches in-
cludes “unjustified” acts and omissions that endanger the physical and
mental health of protected persons in the power of an enemy belligerent.45
Hence, “it is prohibited to subject [protected persons] to any medical pro-
cedure which is not indicated by the state of health of the person con-
cerned and which is not consistent with generally accepted medical
standards . . . .”46 But Additional Protocol I didn’t merely clarify the stan-
dard for discerning grave breaches described in the Conventions.
Beyond a merely exegetical fleshing out of this category of prohibi-
tions, Additional Protocol I sets forth a broad expansion of this class of
conduct by adding to the list of per se grave breaches: removal of tissue
and organs for transplantation except as medically necessary for the pro-
tected person;47 transfer of civilian populations from the occupying state
into an occupied territory;48 transfer or deportation of civilians within or
outside the occupied territory;49 unjustifiable delay in the repatriation of
protected persons;50 practices of apartheid and other degrading treatment
based on racial discrimination;51 and targeting and causing the destruction
of historic cultural monuments.52 There can be no “minor breach” arising
under any of these provisions.
Breaches that are nongrave by virtue of falling outside these provi-
sions include, for example, the use of mass graves or failure to mark the
graves of enemy combatants.53 Similarly, exposing POWs to public display
and humiliation (as well as other “outrages upon personal dignity”)54 may
fail to satisfy this test, provided such conduct is not subsumed by the cate-
gory of “inhuman treatment.”55
45. Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 11. R
46. Id. Even consent of the protected person is no defense for “(a) Physical mutila-
tions; (b) Medical or scientific experiments;” and “(c) Removal of tissue or organs for trans-
plantation, except where these acts are justified [by accepted medical standards].” Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. art. 85(4)(a).
49. Id.
50. Id. art. 85(4)(b).
51. Id. art. 85(4)(c).
52. Id. art 85(4)(d). Professor Ratner also provides a pithy list of grave breaches “in its
totality.” RATNER, supra note 12, at 374. I would take modest issue with some of Professor R
Ratner’s characterizations in the latter class (for instance, he names “perfidious use of the
Red Cross or Red Crescent emblem,” id., as a grave breach without reference to Additional
Protocol I’s qualification of “death or serious injury to body or health,” Additional Protocol
I, supra note 4, art. 85), but his list is otherwise good shorthand for the grave breaches. For an R
argument that the crime of perfidy ought to be a per se grave breach, see Byron D. Greene,
Bridging the Gap that Exists for War Crimes of Perfidy, ARMY LAW, Aug. 2010, at 45, 50-52.
See discussion infra pp. 161.
53. See, e.g., Geneva Convention I, supra note 22, art. 17. R
54. Geneva Convention III, supra note 3, art. 3. R
55. Id., art. 13. There is a possible, though not entirely convincing, construction of this
article that would define this manner of POW abuse as a grave breach. The clause forbidding
POW abuse of this kind appears in an article that explicitly lays out a number of grave
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There are additionally those breaches, described in Additional Proto-
col I, that are grave as a result of the interaction between their forbidden
character and the gravity of the harm caused. These breaches are qualified
by the phrase “causing death or serious injury to body or health.”56 For
example, the crime of perfidy—that is, feigning the intent to surrender,
feigning incapacitation, feigning noncombatant status, or feigning pro-
tected status by use of a protected emblem—is a “minor breach” where it
leads only to military advantage, but grave if it leads to death or serious
injury.57 Targeting civilian areas with nonlethal chemical weapons to effect
their submission would also likely fall within this lesser category.58
Notice that these outcome-determined grave breaches also contain a
causation requirement. It would therefore be insufficient that one of these
enumerated infractions coincides with death or serious injury. Rather, the
death or serious injury must be caused by the violation. This has poten-
tially serious implications for how states treat actors perceived to be in
continual or flagrant violation of the Geneva Conventions.59
The contributions of Additional Protocol I to the grave breaches re-
gime cannot be viewed as mere window dressing. They are substantive.
Though these proscriptions honor (indeed celebrate) the spirit of the origi-
company it keeps, there is nothing specifically to tie this clause to the “serious breaches”
listed alongside it. As such, I have adopted the more reserved reading.
56. Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 85. These breaches, as with all breaches, R
are additionally qualified as applying only to persons eligible for the protections of the Con-
ventions. However, this qualification was essentially rendered a nullity by the terms of Addi-
tional Protocol I. Id. art. 44 (“A combatant who [fails] to meet the requirements [of the
Conventions] shall forfeit his right to be a prisoner of war, but he shall, nevertheless, be given
protections equivalent in all respects to those accorded to prisoners of war by the Third
Convention and by this Protocol.”). Hence, this qualification is meaningful only to those
states—such as the United States, Israel, Iran, and a handful of others—that have not ratified
Additional Protocol I.
57. Id. arts. 37, 85.
58. Id. art. 85. These “outcome-specific” grave breaches are, in their entirety,
“(a) Making the civilian population or individual civilians the object of attack;
(b) Launching an indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian population or civilian
objects in the knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss of life, injury to
civilians or damage to civilian objects . . . ;
(c) Launching an attack against works or installations containing dangerous forces
in the knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss of life, injury to civilians
or damage to civilian objects . . . ;
(d) Making non-defended localities and demilitarized zones the object of attack;
(e) Making a person the object of attack in the knowledge that he is hors de
combat;
(f) The perfidious use, in violation of Article 37, of the distinctive emblem of the
red cross, red crescent or red lion and sun or of other protective signs recognized
by the Conventions or this Protocol.”
Id.
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nal Conventions, Additional Protocol I swept within the ambit of the
grave-breaches regime many of the earlier Conventions’ simple breaches,
thereby shrinking the latter category of violations. 60 This was unquestion-
ably the intent. What, one might then ask, is left of minor breaches?
Because most of the grave breaches listed in Additional Protocol I
require that the conduct in question cause “death or serious injury to body
or health,”61 this leaves to the classification of simple breaches any willful
violation therein listed that fails to cause “death or serious injury to body
or health.”62 By carefully circumscribing a particular subset of offenses,
the set of residual violations (that is, nongrave breaches) is left wide
open.63
60. This principled expansion was coupled with an explicit change in the protections
afforded to parties who—like terrorists and other irregular combatants—systematically devi-
ate from the law of war. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 44 (“While all combat- R
ants are obliged to comply with the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict,
violations of these rules shall not deprive a combatant of his right to be a combatant or, if he
falls into the power of an adverse Party, of his right to be a prisoner of war . . . .”). It came at
a price. Though the United States signed all three Additional Protocols, it has never formally
ratified Additional Protocols I and II. The importance of this fact cannot (and should not) be
understated, despite the self-conscious blushing of American legal scholars hoping not to
evince a parochial bias. As one of the states providing the impetus for the Geneva Conven-
tions following World War II, the United States rarely misses an opportunity to tout its spe-
cial role in the codification of liberal international regimes like the Geneva Conventions. See,
e.g., PRESIDENT’S MESSAGE TO THE SENATE TRANSMITTING A PROTOCOL TO THE 1949 GE-
NEVA CONVENTIONS, 1 PUB. PAPERS 1987-88 (Jan. 29, 1987) reprinted in 81 AM. J. INT’L L.
910, 910 [hereinafter Reagan Letter] (“The United States has traditionally been in the fore-
front of efforts to codify and improve international rules of humanitarian law in armed con-
flict. . . .”). Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to confuse a liberal tendency with a rejection
of the calculus of realpolitik. With respect to the first two Additional Protocols, the United
States has shown a decided preference for the status quo ante, and this seems a situation
unlikely to change in the near future.
61. Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 85. R
62. Id. The Conventions and Additional Protocol I also specify particular mental states
and mental-state-like qualifiers, including “willfully,” “unlawfully,” “wantonly,” and “with-
out justification.” Id. Thus, it is difficult to say with certainty whether violations lacking will-
fulness (or some other mental state) are minor breaches or whether such violations are not
breaches at all. For ease of analysis, I assume the latter; because certain mental states are
codified, I have assumed that these are elements of the breaches themselves rather than
assume that they are elements contributing to the graveness of a given breach. This is a
somewhat arbitrary choice, though, so it would be worth giving further consideration to the
import of mens rea in this regard. See generally Marko Divac ?berg, The Absorption of Grave
Breaches into War Crimes Law, 91 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 163, 173–74 (2009).
63. I would readily concede that this formulation can be seen as a question of framing
or perspective; think of the often-invoked image of two faces that can alternatively be viewed
as a vase. But in many instances it would be hard to imagine how this circumscription limits
the category of simple breaches in quite the manner that it does grave breaches. Although
any willful breach of an enumerated proscription that results in death or serious injury is
grave according to Additional Protocol I, this limitation is one only of ends and not of means.
That being said, the nature of some of the violations is such that it may be difficult to envis-
age their perpetration in such a way that would not be likely to result in death or serious
injury. In yet other situations, violations cannot possibly meet this higher threshold; after all,
some proscriptions relate to the remains of the dead. Nevertheless, I think this formulation is
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For states bound to the original Conventions without the augmenta-
tion of Additional Protocol I,64 there remains an even wider gap through
which to drag the net of simple breaches. Specifically enumerated prohibi-
tions notwithstanding, the original Geneva Conventions conceptually
highlight two basic classes of conduct as grave breaches. As noted above,
“if committed against persons or property protected by the convention,”65
grave breaches are those that “caus[e] great suffering or serious injury to
body or health”66 and those entailing “extensive destruction and appropri-
ation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlaw-
fully and wantonly.”67 As with the residuum from the grave breaches of
Additional Protocol I, the remainder here are minor breaches.68
In short, the field of nongrave breaches is as broad as it is poorly de-
fined. The Geneva Conventions require of all High Contracting Parties to
take all necessary measures to suppress even other-than-grave breaches.69
But the method of suppression is not prescribed. And universal jurisdic-
tion will not lie for breaches that aren’t grave. The next question, then,
must address the nature of the obligation imposed on High Contracting
Parties by the Geneva Conventions’ requirement to “take measures neces-
sary for the suppression of all” breaches. And, as we have seen, this must
be done at least in part by resort to subsequent state practice.70
II. HOW STATES PARTIES SUPPRESS ALL OTHER BREACHES
Complementing the universal jurisdiction of states parties over grave
breaches is the duty “to provide effective penal sanctions for persons com-
mitting, or ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches of” the
undefined residuum of nongrave breaches are not. I think this formulation is also most con-
sonant with the intent of the drafters, who wished to have only a narrow category of breaches
defined as grave.
64. The Additional Protocols amended Convention obligations but only for states par-
ties to the Additional Protocols. See ICRC, States Party to the Following International Hu-
manitarian Law and Other Related Treaties as of 15-Nov-2012, ICRC (Nov. 15, 2012), http://
www.icrc.org/IHL.nsf/(SPF)/party_main_treaties/$File/IHL_and_other_related_Treaties.pdf,
for a list of states that are parties to Additional Protocol I.
65. This qualifier was all but written out of Additional Protocol I by the designation of
any combatant as a POW, and the presumption of POW status for anyone falling into the
hands of the adverse power and claiming such status. Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, art. R
44, 45.
66. Geneva Convention I, supra note 22, art. 50; Geneva Convention II, supra note 23, R
art. 51; Geneva Convention III, supra note 3, art. 130; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 26, R
art. 147.
67. Geneva Convention I, supra note 22, art. 50; Geneva Convention II, supra note 23, R
art. 51; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 26, art. 147. R
68. Geneva Convention I, supra note 22, art. 50; Geneva Convention II, supra note 23, R
art. 51; Geneva Convention III, supra note 3, art. 130; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 26, R
art. 147.
69. Geneva Convention I, supra note 22, art. 49; Geneva Convention II, supra note 23, R
art. 50; Geneva Convention III, supra note 3, art. 129; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 26, R
art. 146.
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Geneva Conventions.71 Falling under this same heading of “Repression of
Abuses and Infractions,” states parties commit “to take all measures nec-
essary for the suppression of all acts contrary to” the Geneva Conven-
tions.72 This is sometimes referred to as a distinction of suppression versus
repression and prevention.73 But the true distinction is not so semantic as
that. In Article 52 of Geneva Convention I, for example, states parties are
obliged to repress any alleged violation of the Convention “with the least
possible delay.”74 The real distinction seems to be the apparent discretion
given to suppress nongrave breaches, whereas grave breaches must be re-
pressed and prevented specifically through legislation of penal sanctions.75
How states exercise this discretion constitutes state practice with respect
to minor breaches.
These practices are highly variable, ranging from the criminalization
of all breaches of IHL and the Geneva Conventions76 to the provision in
military regulations for administrative or disciplinary sanction.77 This
probably represents nearly the whole spectrum of reasonable interpreta-
tions of this duty.78 The ICRC—whose views in this area are traditionally
71. Geneva Convention I, supra note 22, art. 49; Geneva Convention II, supra note 23, R
art. 50; Geneva Convention III, supra note 3, art. 129; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 26, R
art. 146.
72. Geneva Convention I, supra note 22, art. 49; Geneva Convention II, supra note 23, R
art. 50; Geneva Convention III, supra note 3, art. 129; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 26, R
art. 146.
73. See, e.g., Thomas J. Murphy, Sanctions and Enforcement of the Humanitarian Law
of the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Geneva Protocol I of 1977, 103 MIL. L. REV. 3,
27 (1984) (noting the similarity of the two phrases while suggesting that “repression,” as used
in the Geneva Conventions, “appears to demand the imposition of penal punishment,
whereas suppression of other than grave breaches connotes utilization of administrative and
disciplinary measures as well as penal sanctions for the prevention and punishment of simple
breaches.”). M. Pictet, however, suggests that there is no clear distinction; while describing
the negotiations with respect to these very words and the different phrases chosen for the
French and English texts, he goes on to define the “primary purpose of the paragraph” refer-
ring to suppression (in the English text) as “the repression of infractions other than ‘grave
breaches’ . . . .” PICTET, supra note 10, at 367. R
74. Geneva Convention I, supra note 22, art. 52; Geneva Convention II, supra note 23, R
art. 53; Geneva Convention III, supra note 3, art. 132; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 26, R
art. 149.
75. States parties to the Geneva Conventions are also required to enact legislation
adequate to prevent and repress any abuses of the protected “distinctive signs” established
under the Conventions, despite the fact that their abuse constitutes a grave breach only if it
results in death, injury, or damage to property. Geneva Convention II, supra note 23, art. 45. R
76. Ireland’s Geneva Conventions Act of 1962 is such an exception. Geneva Conven-
tions Act, 1962, (Act No. 11/1962) (Ir.), available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1962/en/
act/pub/0011/print.html.
77. HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY, THE NAVY, THE AIR FORCE, AND
THE MARINE CORPS, ARMY REGULATION 190–8, OPNAVINST 3461.6, AFJI 31–304, MCO
3461.1, ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR, RETAINED PERSONNEL, CIVILIAN INTERNEES AND
OTHER DETAINEES (1997) [hereinafter U.S. MILITARY DETENTION REGULATIONS].
78. More stringent measures are not, however, unimaginable. A state might adopt leg-
islation providing for universal jurisdiction over all breaches of the Geneva Conventions,
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given a great deal of respect79—has adopted M. Pictet’s view in its Model
Geneva Conventions Act (Model Act).80 Section 4 of the Model Act, enti-
tled “Punishment of other breaches of the Conventions and Protocols,”
provides that
(1) Any person, whatever his or her nationality, who, in [INSERT
COUNTRY NAME], commits, or aids, abets or procures any
other person to commit, a breach of any of the Conventions
or Protocols not covered by section 3,81 is guilty of an indicta-
ble offence.
(2) Any national of [INSERT COUNTRY NAME] who, outside
[INSERT COUNTRY NAME], commits, or aids, abets or
procures the commission by another person of a breach of any
of the Conventions or Protocols not covered by section 3 is
guilty of an indictable offence.82
Although some authorities have suggested that this approach is a “modern
tendency,”83 there are relatively few states that have expressly adopted
statutory language as specific as the Model Act on this point. Thus, despite
what the ICRC and its commentators imagine (or wish) the requirement
aroused by states implementing ambitious universal jurisdiction regimes, see Steven Ratner,
Belgium’s War Crimes Statute: A Post-Mortem, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 888 (2003). But on the
opposite end of the spectrum, it is somewhat more difficult to imagine more lax steps taken
for an accused combatant than those typically described as administrative or disciplinary.
Still, I won’t foreclose the possibility. But given my own experience in the military, I will
assume that administrative or disciplinary measures without penal sanction represent the
lower limits of reasonableness.
79. See generally David P. Forsythe, 30 INT’L ORG. 607, The Red Cross As Transna-
tional Movement: Conserving and Changing the Nation-State System (1976) (describing the
historical functions of the ICRC, its special role in international law, and the respect it is
accorded in this area). See also Yvez Sandoz, The Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross as Guardian
of Int’l Humanitarian Law, ICRC RESOURCE CENTRE (Dec. 31, 1998), http://www.icrc.org/
eng/resources/documents/misc/about-the-icrc-311298.htm; Geneva Convention I, supra note
22, art. 3 (referring to the ICRC as an “impartial humanitarian body”). R
80. ICRC, Model Law: Geneva Conventions (Consolidations) Act (for Common Law
States) §§ 3–4 (2008) available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/model_law_gc-ap-
i-ii-iii.pdf [hereinafter Model Act].
81. Part III covers punishment of grave breaches.
82. Model Act, supra note 80, §4. R
83. Alexandre Faite & Umesh Kadam, Implementation of International Humanitarian
Law in Japan: The ICRC Perspectives, GENEVA ACADEMY (2005), http://www.geneva-acad
emy.ch/RULAC/pdf_state/ICRC-perspective.pdf. Some commentators are less sanguine
about this “tendency.” Yasmin Naqvi, for instance, in praising the Model Geneva Conven-
tions Act, notes that “[w]hereas many existing Geneva Convention Acts draw a procedural
distinction between the treatment of grave breaches . . . and other breaches, the Model Act
treats all breaches in the same fashion and imposes maximum penalties.” Yasmin Naqvi,
Books and review: “Punishing Violations of International Humanitarian Law at the National
Level: A Guide for Common Law States,” INT’L REV. RED CROSS, Jun. 30, 2002 (book re-
view). The Model Act is then, like much model legislation relating to international law, lex
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to be, state practice lends little support to an expectation that states par-
ties are required affirmatively to legislate in this area.
For instance, the United States—which, for its part, has a stated policy
of treating any violation of IHL as “war crime”84—has only affirmatively
legislated with respect to a discrete set of statutorily defined war crimes,
which includes grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions.85 The United
States also goes so far as defining as grave certain violations of Common
Article 3, despite the fact that the prohibitions of Common Article 3 do
not formally fall within the grave-breaches regime.86
Much less common are states that affirmatively criminalize nongrave
breaches. One well-known example of this is Ireland.87 The Irish Geneva
Conventions Act makes the commission of any minor breach by any Irish
citizen anywhere or by a noncitizen in Ireland a criminal offense.88 The act
then defines a “minor breach” as
(a) contravention of a provision of any of the Scheduled Conven-
tions or of Protocol I which is not any such grave breach of
that Convention or that Protocol as is mentioned in the rele-
vant Article thereof referred to in section 3 of this Act, or
(b) a contravention of Protocol II.89
Other Anglophone states like Australia 90 and Canada,91 have, like
the United States, specifically criminalized only grave breaches. Many of
these states have also passed laws and regulations to provide for the pre-
vention and repression of misuse of protected emblems (such as the red
cross and red crescent);92 depending on the outcome of the anticipated
misuse, these sorts of regulations can be understood as taking express aim
at nongrave breaches.93
Thus, although most states have passed legislation criminalizing grave
breaches, few have gone farther and addressed nongrave breaches.94 Of
84. RATNER, supra note 12, at 375. R
85. War Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441(c)(1) (2006).
86. Id.
87. Geneva Conventions Act, 1962, (Act No. 11/1962) (Ir.), available at http://www
.irishstatutebook.ie/1962/en/act/pub/0011/print.html.
88. Ireland’s Geneva Conventions Act of 1962 is such an exception. Id.
89. Id.
90. Geneva Conventions Act 1957 (Austl.).
91. Geneva Conventions Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. G-3 (Can.).
92. ICRC, National implementation of International Humanitarian Law: Biannual Up-
date on National Legislation and Case Law, July–December 2004, 87 INT’L REV. RED CROSS
217, 218-19 (2005).
93. Of course, as discussed supra note 74, this is required of the Conventions. Geneva R
Convention II, supra note 23, art. 50. And as alluded to infra Part IV, this may be the most R
efficient way of regulating conduct that can quite readily overcome the grave breach
threshold
94. For a comprehensive list of legislative enactments by states relating to war crimes
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those few, most have simply inserted language into their military
regulations.95
In the face of such variable state practice, it is difficult to maintain that
states parties to the Geneva Conventions understand their burden as M.
Pictet did.96 Although the ICRC has a certain degree of moral authority in
interpreting IHL, its normative preference is, at the very least, not shared
by the states, which are the genesis of international law.
But setting aside for a moment the normative desirability of address-
ing all breaches legislatively, there remains the question why the text of
the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I ought to be read as
requiring domestic legislation to suppress nongrave breaches in the first
place. The VCLT places a premium on the “ordinary meaning” of a
treaty’s terms.97 And whereas the Geneva Conventions’ terms make clear
that domestic legislation is necessary to repress grave breaches, this clarity
is absent with respect to all other breaches. This fact, working in combina-
tion with the VCLT’s prescribed reliance on subsequent practice, makes
the ICRC’s claim in this regard somewhat dubious. What, then, does the
duty to suppress “really” mean? The next Part addresses this question.
III. THE “REAL” MEANING OF THE DUTY TO SUPPRESS
ALL OTHER BREACHES
Understanding the lay of the land with regard to nongrave breaches
does not require only a rough description of that category’s features and a
broad view of state practice—or the lack of state practice—pertaining to
those breaches. There is also the question of what the Geneva Conven-
tions and Additional Protocol I were actually intended to require of states.
State practice being largely negative, the discussion above suggests some-
thing about what the duty is not. If there is a true obligation, however (a
mestically, see Int’l Comm. Of the Red Cross, Practice Relating to Rule 156: Definition of
War Crimes, ICRC RESOURCE CENTRE, http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_
rule156.
95. The U.S. military, for instance, can make use of very general statutory language in
the Uniform Code of Military Justice to punish virtually any imaginable infraction, 10 U.S.C.
§ 934 art. 134 (1956) (“Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter, all disorders and
neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces, all conduct of a
nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes and offenses not capital, of which
persons subject to this chapter may be guilty, shall be taken cognizance of by a general,
special, or summary court-martial, according to the nature and degree of the offense, and
shall be punished at the discretion of that court.”). Specific regulation of conduct contrary to
the law of war other than grave breaches is left to lower-level regulation and standing orders,
the contravention of which are grounds for disciplinary action. 10 U.S.C. §892, art. 92 (1956)
(“Any person subject to this chapter who— (1) violates or fails to obey any lawful general
order or regulation; (2) having knowledge of any other lawful order issued by a member of
the armed forces, which it is his duty to obey, fails to obey the order; or (3) is derelict in the
performance of his duties; shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.”). For a compre-
hensive list of military regulations states have enacted to proscribe war crimes, see ICRC,
supra note 94.
96. PICTET, supra note 10, at 368. R
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question whose answer is debatable), divining it means turning to the stan-
dard tools of the trade for international legal interpretation.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is the primary instru-
ment governing the interpretation of an international agreement. The
VCLT has two primary provisions governing interpretation: Articles 31
and 32, which are labeled “General rule of interpretation” and “Supple-
mentary means of interpretation,” respectively.98
Article 31 first explains that “[a] treaty shall be interpreted . . . in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to [its] terms . . . in their
context and in light of its object and purpose.”99 That article then defines a
treaty’s “context” by enumerating, in addition to the agreement’s full
text,100 “[a]ny agreement relating to the treaty which was made between
all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty” and “[a]ny
instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument
related to the treaty.” It goes on to provide that three other factors “shall
be taken into account, together with the context.”101 Those factors are,
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its
interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the rela-
tions between the parties.102
Finally, Article 31 declares that “[a] special meaning shall be given to a
term if it is established that the parties so intended.”103
The VCLT also provides for “recourse to . . . supplementary means of
interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the cir-
cumstances of its conclusion.” 104 This is the function of Article 32. The
resort to such means is permitted either to “confirm the meaning resulting
from the application of Article 31, or to determine the meaning when the
interpretation according to Article 31: (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous
98. Id. arts. 31–32.
99. Id. art. 31.




104. Id. art. 32. This provision provides the justification for a pervasive hostility toward
such supplemental means of interpretation in international law. Although such hostility may
be overstated, see Julian Mortenson, The Travaux of Travaux: A History of the Rules of
Treaty Interpretation (Working Paper), I will proceed according to the prevalent understand-
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or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or
unreasonable.”105
Thus, the accepted way of finding the meaning of the treaty obligation
to “suppress[ ] all acts contrary to the provisions of the” Geneva Conven-
tions “other than the grave breaches” is to feed through the VCLT’s inter-
pretative machinery the provision from which that obligation springs.
Although this obligation stems from a different article in each of the Ge-
neva Conventions, the operative text is the same in each: “Each High Con-
tracting Party shall take measures necessary for the suppression of all acts
contrary to the provisions of the present Convention other than the grave
breaches defined in the following Article.”106 Of the Additional Protocols,
only Additional Protocol I speaks to “the repression of breaches” as dis-
tinct from grave breaches or, for that matter, of grave breaches at all.107 It
expressly incorporates the requirement from the Geneva Conventions and
declares that requirement to apply to breaches and grave breaches of the
Additional Protocol.108 In other words, Additional Protocol I, although it
lengthens the list of grave breaches considerably, provides no further gui-
dance as to nature of the requirement to suppress simple breaches.
As a matter of fact, Additional Protocol I only muddies the waters
further with its Article 87, which addresses the duties of commanders “to
prevent and, where necessary, to suppress and to report” grave breaches
committed by their subordinates.109 To this end, “High Contracting Par-
ties to the conflict shall require that . . . commanders ensure that [those]
under their command are aware of their obligations under the Conven-
tions and [Additional Protocol I].”110 Further, Article 87 dictates that
High Contracting Parties and Parties to the conflict shall require
any commander who is aware that [those under his command] are
going to commit or have committed a breach . . . to initiate such
steps as are necessary to prevent such violations of the Conven-
tions or [Additional Protocol I], and, where appropriate, to initi-
ate disciplinary or penal action against violators thereof.111
This article perpetuates the obscure nature of the state’s duty in three
important ways. First, it still does not clarify what manner of mechanism
states are expected to use in placing these requirements on their com-
manders. Second, the article makes clear that either “disciplinary or penal
105. VCLT, supra note 16, art. 32. R
106. Geneva Convention I, supra note 22, art. 49; Geneva Convention II, supra note 23, R
art. 50; Geneva Convention III, supra note 3, art. 129; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 26, R
art. 146.
107. Only Additional Protocol I applies to armed conflicts of an international character,
so the restriction of the grave breaches framework to international armed conflict (IAC)
excludes the other Additional Protocols. Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 85 R
108. Id.
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action against violators” is appropriate, and nonpenal disciplinary action
to be taken against members of the armed forces is not typically codified
through a formal legislative process.112 But perhaps most confounding is
that the word “suppress” as used here seems by its context to be purely
responsive to already-completed or ongoing breaches, whereas the Ge-
neva Conventions give the distinct impression that suppression and repres-
sion are intended to apply not only retrospectively but also prospectively.
So although “suppress” and “repress” are used almost interchangeably in
the earlier Conventions and presumably include any actions taken by a
state to prevent, discourage, or halt breaches, Article 87 makes these
words—which are already the source of ambiguity—less clear still.
In short, whatever interpretation one reaches in examining the duty to
suppress all breaches of the Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocol I
does nothing to clarify or confirm that interpretation. This leaves as the
only sensible point of attack the duty as it appears in the Conventions
themselves.
The first thing to note when applying the method prescribed by the
VCLT is that the Geneva Conventions have something to say about High
Contracting Parties legislating with regard to violations of the Conven-
tions. The Conventions each require states parties “to enact any legislation
necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or
ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches of the” Geneva Con-
ventions.113 As to “the suppression of all acts contrary to the provisions of
the” Geneva Conventions, however, they are silent on the matters of legis-
lation and penal sanctions. And by the familiar interpretative maxim of
expressio unius est exclusio alterius,114 the “ordinary meaning” of the
treaty’s terms—the primary interpretative tool under the VCLT115—ex-
presses an intent that such measures not be required.
Turning to the “context” of the Geneva Conventions—that is, other
agreements or instruments, among all the parties, made “in connection
with the conclusion of the treaty”116—only the other Geneva Conventions
satisfy the definition. And because each Convention uses the same phras-
ing, relying on this as context produces mere tautology. The object and
purpose of the Geneva Conventions might provide a little more basis on
which to rest an assumption of a legislative requirement. But even suppos-
ing that the object and purpose of the Geneva Conventions is as broad as
112. Id.
113. Geneva Convention I, supra note 22, art. 49; Geneva Convention II, supra note 23, R
art. 50; Geneva Convention III, supra note 3, art. 129; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 26, R
art. 146.
114. This is a standard rule of interpretation meaning that the inclusion of certain lan-
guage is intended to exclude language not provided.
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ushering in an end to all “uncivilized” warfare,117 it cannot be said with
any degree of certainty that the states parties imagined legislation to be
the only acceptable way of achieving this goal.118 And even were there
some slender ledge of object and purpose on which to hang such a suppo-
sition, its logic is belied by the states parties themselves, whose practices
evince their understanding of the obligations imposed.
That state practice informs our understanding of a treaty’s meaning is
a result of the additional factors enumerated by the VCLT as those that
“shall be taken into account, together with the context.”119 The first—that
of subsequent agreement regarding the interpretation or application of the
treaty120—can be satisfied only by the Additional Protocols. But, as de-
scribed above, these Protocols do nothing to clarify this particular obliga-
tion.121 Moreover, whereas the underlying Conventions enjoy universal
participation, the Additional Protocols do not.122 There is thus no
purchase to be found in looking to subsequent agreements.
Subsequent practice,123 however, is instructive. As described above,
state practice on this matter displays a significant variety of views on what
states find “necessary” to suppress nongrave breaches.124 More impor-
tantly, much of that state practice flies in the face of a purported commit-
ment by states parties to affirmatively legislate. These facts militate
strongly against an understanding that requires such a commitment.
Finally, we may look to any relevant rules of international law as they
pertain to the relationship between the parties.125 Because the Geneva
Conventions are universal, only universal norms among the parties can be
germane. But universal norms like the U.N. Charter or the rules of cus-
117. PICTET, supra note 10 at 16. (“Should the disaster of a new war occur, [the Con- R
ventions] will be a safeguard for countless persons and the last refuge of civilization and
humanity.”).
118. We might note that no “purpose” is provided in the Geneva Conventions save that
“of revising the Convention[s] concluded at Geneva on July 27, 1929,” Geneva Convention I,
supra note 22, pmbl., but one need not go so far to find the treaties’ actual object and pur- R
pose to be wanting if one is looking for an affirmative gesture toward a required method for
suppressing all acts contrary to the Conventions. In any event, a treaty’s object and purpose
need not be explicit in the text of the agreement. Although this is sometimes done, see, e.g.,
Agreement on Extradition Between the European Union and the United States of America,
U.S.-Eur. Union, art. 1, June 25, 2003, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 109-14 (providing that its object
and purpose is “to provide for enhancements to cooperation and mutual legal assistance.”);
Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism art. 1, June 3, 2002, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 107-
18 (listing as its purpose the prevention, punishment, and elimination of terrorism), it often is
not. So rejection of any object and purpose not expressed in a treaty’s terms would be to
require an uncommon and stultifying exactitude.
119. VCLT, supra note 16, art. 31. R
120. Id.
121. See discussion supra part II.
122. ICRC, States Party to the Following International Humanitarian Law and Other
Related Treaties as of 15-Nov-2012, supra note 64. R
123. VCLT, supra note 16, art. 31. R
124. See supra Part II.
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tomary international law have little to say in this regard. In fact, the pre-
vailing understanding of customary international law, as famously put
forth in the Lotus Case, provides that all things are permitted to states that
are not forbidden to them.126 Thus, even this avenue leads only back to
the discretion of the states parties.
There are, additionally, the supplementary means of interpretation
provided for in the VCLT.127 But “to confirm the meaning resulting from
the application of article 31” gives little assistance if that meaning is still
contestable.128 And I do not intend to suggest that any of the possible
meanings for the duty to suppress grave breaches is “manifestly absurd or
unreasonable.”129 That leaves only ambiguity or obscurity as justification
for resort to supplementary means like travaux préparatoires. Admittedly,
there is room for disagreement here, but given that the weight of evidence
from the application of VCLT Article 31 suggests a single and unambigu-
ous—albeit vague—standard, I will not explore these supplementary
sources in any depth.
Thus, the understanding of M. Pictet and the ICRC notwithstanding,
application of the VCLT’s interpretative machinery suggests that the
“nongrave breaches regime” is one that affords total discretion to states in
determining what measures are in this sense “necessary.”130 That is to say
that it is largely a permissive norm. The question, then, is what the impli-
cations of such a discretionary regime are.
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT
NONGRAVE-BREACHES REGIME
There is a sense in which it is easy to dismiss worries about how states
choose to suppress nongrave breaches. As was earlier mentioned, some
commentators have suggested that nongrave breaches simply do not rise
to a level of gravity cognizable in a universal international regime.131 In
fact, most (if not all) commentators have come to this conclusion with re-
spect to at least some class of minor violation.132 But there is some sense
in which the gravity of the offenses themselves is less important than how
126. See S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7).
127. These include “the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its
conclusion. . . .” VCLT, supra note 16, art. 32. R
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. There is the additional question of what these provisions mean in monist states
where treaties are self-executing. In such cases, no implementing legislation is necessary. It is
not at all clear what that means when a treaty standard such as this provides such wide
latitude. This is, in effect, the same as legislating the treaty’s prohibitions, but it says nothing
of the method of punishment. Given that nullum poena sine lege is as well-established a rule
as nullum crimen sine lege, it seems evident that the state need still set out penalties before
even self-executing prohibitions can have meaningful force.
131. See FLORES, supra note 6, at 266. R
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states understand their burden to suppress all breaches, irrespective of
gravity.
First, there is the obvious problem of impunity. If even grave breaches
are often met with something less than the full penal sanctions required by
the Geneva Conventions (including impunity), 133 then it is quite probable
that states (and more of them) are substantially more likely to flout their
obligations with respect to minor violations—whether in the letter of their
laws or in the pursuit and punishment of violators—where they have such
broad discretion. This suggests a lacuna in the regime, or at least a blind
spot. States do not typically take cognizance of minor breaches committed
by foreign nationals in foreign territories, so there is a class of violator that
enjoys impunity not only in their home states (from which extradition
would be unusual)134 but also throughout the globe.
This is doubly troubling, for the commentators are largely in agree-
ment that even simple breaches can, if repeated, come to be classified as
grave.135 But this is strictly a function of the Additional Protocols and the
Fact-Finding Commission.136 No such mechanism exists to escalate the
gravity of repeated nongrave breaches for states that are party only to the
Conventions and not to the Additional Protocols. So while it is widely
understood that there ought to be some way of recognizing the gravity of
repeated violations that glide just below the grave-breach threshold, it is
not at all clear how such transubstantiation is supposed to occur in many
cases of this sort.
Another problem is the simple lack of uniformity. In some ways, a
more stringent standard is a more exact standard, and a more permissive
standard is less exact (or, to coin a legal term of art, vague). Permissive
standards grant discretion, and discretion in the law typically serves a pur-
pose. More discretion is desirable in circumstances that are best dealt with
by localized or particularized procedures that are specially adapted to
those circumstances.137 Less discretion is appropriate in instances where
133. RATNER, supra note 12, at 376. R
134. ICRC, Practice Relating to Rule 161: International Cooperation in Criminal Pro-
ceedings - Section C. Extradition of Own Nationals, ICRC RESOURCE CENTRE (2013), http://
www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_cha_chapter44_rule161_sectionc.
135. CLAUDE PILLOUD ET. AL, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8
JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, ¶ 3621 (1987); see also Flo-
res, supra note 6, at 266. It is interesting to note here that this assertion is made in the R
Commentary on the Additional Protocols where it explicates the meaning of Article 90 of
Additional Protocol I, which constitutes the Fact-Finding Commission. The Commission must
also distinguish between grave breaches and nongrave breaches, as it may only enquire into
facts related to the former. The point being made in the Commentary is that there is play in
the joints where nongrave breaches are repeatedly committed. But this structure and the
language used in Additional Protocol I further militate against the notion that the states
parties’ obligations are procedurally the same with respect to these different classes of
breaches. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 90. R
136. PILLOUD, supra note 135, ¶ 3621. R
137. See generally, 63C AM. JUR. 2D Public Officers and Employees § 228 (explaining
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one would expect to find very little variance among jurisdictions and
circumstances.138
With regard to grave breaches, the Geneva Conventions leave very
little discretion: states parties are to pass legislation necessary to ensure
criminal sanctions are brought to bear against perpetrators of grave
breaches. And if states are unable to prosecute and, where applicable,
punish those accused of committing grave breaches, such accused are to be
extradited to a state whose criminal justice system has the capacity to do
so. This is despite the fact that states have, among other things, different
propensities for aggression; different capabilities in carrying out warfare;
different legislative, judicial, and penal systems; different enforcement ca-
pacities; different norms with respect to punishment; and different levels
of ex ante compliance with the Conventions’ legislative requirements. But
these same differences abide no matter which genus of breach we discuss.
So there should be something about the grave-breaches regime that coun-
sels less discretion and greater uniformity.
Clearly, one factor involved is the gravity of the conduct proscribed.
Related to this is the normative desirability of using the law to express the
opprobrium of the international community toward these breaches in par-
ticular. Either of these distinctions might justify differential treatment for
nongrave breaches. As to the former factor, simple breaches are plainly
considered less grave. And as to the latter, treating all breaches as equal
might dilute the expressive value of singling out a narrow field of viola-
tions for ultimate disapprobation. But whereas these distinctions justify
different types and degrees of punishment and different kinds of adjudica-
tive jurisdiction,139 it is unclear how requiring states parties to legislate
with respect to nongrave breaches in any way affects—let alone acts to the
detriment of—these concerns.
Yet there are compelling reasons to desire uniformity in this area. The
first, as mentioned above, is that there seems to be some vaguely defined
(if not wholly undefined) point at which simple breaches have been re-
peated often enough that they transform into grave breaches.140 If this is
so, there is no way to monitor this metamorphosis except through the
Fact-Finding Commission, which has jurisdiction only where states ratified
Additional Protocol I.141 This also means that some grave breaches born
through this repetitive, cumulative process are likely to go unpunished (if
not totally unregulated).
Another argument for uniformity is that a uniform requirement to leg-
islate regarding nongrave breaches is more amenable to monitoring state
practice with respect to compliance. Although left to domestic devices, this
is a matter of international law, and the ability to define and develop inter-
138. This is often distinguished from discretionary action as “ministerial.”
139. That is, mandatory universal jurisdiction as opposed to merely permissive universal
jurisdiction.
140. PILLOUD, supra note 135, ¶ 3621 (1987). R
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national law in many ways hinges on being able to observe it.142 This in-
cludes the ability to observe how states graft the Conventions’ mandates
into their domestic codes, and that capability is hobbled by an inability to
point to affirmative domestic law.
But perhaps the most important reason that uniform requirements
would be desirable is that many of the behaviors involved in both classes
of breach are the same, with only the difference in outcomes determining
the level of repression required of states parties.143 This profoundly under-
mines a distinction based on normative expression; such a distinction sug-
gests that certain conduct is unacceptable only where it results in certain
kinds of actual harm.144 Needless to say, that’s how the Geneva Conven-
tions are drafted, so we cannot now quibble with the text on normative
grounds not embodied therein. But we can at least reject the idea that it is
solely for the sake of normative expression that the grave breaches have
been set apart.
So, to the extent that the current regime of granting states broad dis-
cretion in dealing with nongrave breaches lacks justificatory and explana-
tory basis, the concern is not only with the vagueness of the regime in this
area but also with its legitimacy.
And perhaps the most provocative implication involves the additional
problem of how states treat other actors in light of their different levels of
compliance with the prohibitions against nongrave breaches. States so in-
clined may be able to manipulate the entire IHL regime by taking advan-
tage of the vagueness in this area. One example of this problem is
particularly salient. Since September 11, 2001, there has been a great deal
of academic and political debate about whether and to what extent the
Geneva Conventions apply to nonstate actors.145 The debate has hinged
on a number of issues, many of which are not relevant to this discus-
142. Again, to some extent the very meaning of international law—not only customary
international law, but also treaty law—depends on being able to adduce state practice. Com-
pare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 (1987) (“Customary inter-
national law results from a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a
sense of legal obligation.”), with VCLT, supra note 16, art. 31 (instructing that a treaty’s R
context be interpreted together with the subsequent practice of states parties in applying the
treaty).
143. Although the U.S. War Crimes Act conscientiously includes the offense of attempt
for the war crimes arising under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, there is no
mention of attempt in the section on grave breaches. War Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 2441 (2006). The Conventions themselves make no mention of attempt, which further em-
phasizes the weight given to outcomes in determining the gravity of a breach.
144. From a practical standpoint, the fact that the conduct involved is potentially identi-
cal suggests that uniformity in the obligations of states parties with respect to nongrave
breaches would also better suppress grave breaches, assuming of course that passing criminal
legislation is an effective method of suppressing grave breaches.
145. See, e.g., Derek Jinks, The Applicability of the Geneva Conventions to the Global
War on Terrorism, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 165, 167 (2005-2006); Jordan J. Paust, War and Enemy
Status after 9/11: Attacks on the Laws of War, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 325, 328 (2003); William A.
Schabas, Punishment of Non-State Actors in Non-International Armed Conflict, 26 FORDHAM
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sion.146 But one of the arguments in this area that has found some traction
is that, because the Taliban, al Qaeda, and their affiliates have systemati-
cally rejected the laws and customs of war, their fighters should not be
allowed to benefit from the protections of the laws of war, and especially
those protections afforded by Geneva Convention III.147 To unpack that
claim, one has to account for a number of moving parts. The first is that
Geneva Convention III describes only a certain class of detainees—
namely those who abide by the combatant restrictions of Article 4 of Ge-
neva Convention III—as POWs.148 The second piece is that only properly
designated POWs are entitled to the protections of Geneva Convention
III.149 Finally, there is the idea that only the special protections of Geneva
Convention III are operational in this context because Common Article 3
doesn’t apply other than in a noninternational armed conflict (NIAC).150
So to apply these rules syllogistically to, for instance, Taliban fighters, the
argument goes as follows: Taliban fighters do not abide by the restrictions
of Geneva Convention III; only combatants who abide by those restric-
tions can be POWs and afforded the concomitant protections; therefore,
Taliban fighters are afforded no protections under the Geneva Conven-
tions. 151 Thus, an established and systematic practice of noncompliance
with the Conventions by a party to an armed conflict—including where
146. These other issues include whether a “failed state” ought to be treated as the state
party that originally agreed to and ratified the Conventions and whether a conflict between a
state and a nonstate actor even fits within the Geneva Conventions’ rubric of “noninterna-
tional armed conflict” (NIAC). See, e.g., Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant
Attorney General of the United States, to William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, Depart-
ment of Defense (Jan. 9, 2002), available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSA
EBB127/02.01.09.pdf [hereinafter Yoo Memorandum]. For the text of “Common Article 3”
giving rise to this latter contention, see Geneva Convention I, supra note 22, art. 3; Geneva R
Convention II, supra note 23, art. 3; Geneva Convention III, supra note 3, art. 3; Geneva R
Convention IV, supra note 26, art. 3. R
147. Yoo Memorandum, supra note 146; see also Memorandum from Assistant Attor- R
ney General Jay S. Bybee to The White House Counsel on the status of Taliban Forces under
Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949, at 2 (7 February 2002), available at http://
dspace.wrlc.org/doc/bitstream/2041/70957/00200_020207_001display.pdf [hereinafter Bybee
Memorandum].
148. Geneva Convention III, supra note 3, art. 4 (providing, inter alia, that “members R
of other militias and members of other volunteer corps” must, to be designated as POWs
“fulfill the following conditions: (a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates; (b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; (c) that of
carrying arms openly; [and] (d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the
laws and customs of war.”).
149. Id. Note that this assertion addresses only the protections that are particular to
Geneva Convention III.
150. Id. art. 3; see also RATNER, supra note 12, at 375–76. R
151. I do not pretend that this is a watertight syllogism any more than I think it a water-
tight interpretation of the Geneva Conventions, but this is the argument. One troubling as-
pect of this argument is that there is considerable overlap between Geneva Conventions I
and II and Geneva Convention III, which raises the question whether the former two Con-
ventions apply to our hypothetical Taliban fighters in this posited framework. Such questions,






      10/10/2013   11:12:26
34040-mil_34-4 Sheet No. 94 Side A      10/10/2013   11:12:26
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MIL\34-4\MIL403.txt unknown Seq: 25  4-OCT-13 13:33
Summer 2013] All Other Breaches 853
the noncompliance amounts to systematically committing nongrave
breaches—can be used to justify an interpretation of the Conventions that
strips that party’s combatants of their immunities under the Convention.
In this example, the most damning accusation leveled is that the
Taliban do not abide by the laws and customs of war. The most egregious
law-of-war violation alleged is that the Taliban and their “associated
forces” refuse to observe the principle of discrimination (or distinction),152
which is the most fundamental duty of a combatant under international
law.153 But the Geneva Conventions are instruments of individual ac-
countability, and not a way of designating as criminal enterprises154 cer-
tain belligerent groups (assuming that they are associated with a bona fide
state party). So assuming that some of the forces (that is, some “militias or
volunteer corps”155) fighting for the Taliban during the U.S. invasion or
early occupation of Afghanistan were just soldiers in the conventional
sense and that they were targeting only combatants, some other “system-
atic” violations must be doing the work of this argument.
Another potentially significant violation relevant to this analysis is the
failure to wear “fixed distinctive sign[s] recognizable at a distance.”156 The
rub is that the requirement to affix such insignia, although a violation of
other laws and customs of war (namely the 1907 Hague Convention157), is
a facet of the proscription of perfidy in Additional Protocol I.158 But this is
152. Yoo Memorandum, supra note 146 at 13. R
153. See Lester Nurick, The Distinction Between Combatant and Noncombatant in the
Law of War, 39 AM. J. INT’L L. 680, 680 (1945).
154. “Criminal enterprise” in the war crimes context is a concept laid out in the so-
called Nuremburg Charter. See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major
War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 280.
155. Geneva Convention III, supra note 3, art. 4. To be sure, there is a certain corporate R
understanding implicit in the language of Geneva Convention III, but it seems plain that it
cannot be purely corporate. If a given militia or corps has a single member who violates the
law and custom of war, that surely cannot revoke the protections for the entire unit. Moreo-
ver, even those advancing this theory do not pretend that the duty is strictly corporate. See
Bybee Memorandum, supra note 147 at 4. (“We conclude, however, that the four basic condi- R
tions that apply to militias must also apply, at a minimum, to members of armed forces who
would be legally entitled to POW status.”).
156. Geneva Convention III, supra note 3, art. 4. The other two criteria are also cited, R
but these are rarely relied upon as the determinative factors. The first—that of being com-
manded by a person responsible for his subordinates—simply cannot be assumed away for
every company of fighters in Afghanistan at the relevant times. The second—that of carrying
arms openly—is brushed aside even by most of the exponents of this argument, and with an
almost embarrassing dismissiveness. See, e.g., Bybee Memorandum, supra note 147 at R
3(“[T]the Taliban militia carried arms openly. This fact, however, is of little significance be-
cause many people in Afghanistan carry arms openly.”). Some, however, have refused to
cede even this ground. See Yoo Memorandum, supra note 146 at 13 (“[T]hey have refused to R
wear uniform or insignia or carry arms openly . . . .”).
157. Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 1,
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/law
ofwar/hague04.htm.
158. Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 37. Admittedly, the colors on my palette R
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not a grave breach. Only perfidy that results in an adversary being killed,
captured, or wounded is prohibited at all,159 and the presence vel non of
visible insignia on armed combatants in a hot battle are not likely to be
causally relevant. Moreover, the only such perfidy rising to the level of
grave breach in Additional Protocol I is that involving the use of the pro-
tected emblems (the Red Cross, Red Crescent, etc.).160
In effect, some states parties may categorically deny the applicability
of the Geneva Conventions to other states parties’ forces by virtue of a
failure to adequately suppress the commission of nongrave breaches of the
Conventions (which in this case is an omission). This is particularly puz-
zling given that so many states (including the United States) employ spe-
cialized commandos who quite clearly do not always conform to the
visible-insignia requirements of the Geneva Convention. 161 It strains
credibility to suggest that these states would consider all their forces ut-
terly without protection because, as a matter of state policy, some number
of their combatants engage in covert operations.
If this is a legitimate exercise of discretion under the Geneva Conven-
tions, the contours of this discretion are by no means clear.162 But supply-
expressly extending some of the protections of the Geneva Conventions even to parties who
fail to abide by the laws and customs of war, id. art. 75, and it was in part this provision that
led the United States to reject Additional Protocol I. See Reagan Letter, supra note 60. So it R
may be problematic to cite the terms of this later agreement when attempting to demonstrate
a principle related to how parties carry out their obligations under the earlier agreement.
Nevertheless, it is useful in this context because there is no dispute that this conduct (failure
of combatants to wear a visible insignia) is a violation of IHL, and it is furthermore indirectly
proscribed by Geneva Convention III in that it defines conditions for the applicability of the
treaty. In other words, the argument put forth is that this is a failure to abide by (that is, a
breach of) the terms of the Geneva Conventions, so it cannot be claimed that the logic here is
built on entirely extrinsic breaches of IHL.
159. Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 37. R
160. Id. art. 85.
161. See Michael McAndrew, Note, Wrangling in the Shadows: The Use of United States
Special Forces in Covert Military Operations in the War on Terror, 29 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 153, 163 (Dec. 2006); see also Kenneth Watkin, Warriors Without Rights? Combatants,
Unprivileged Belligerents, and the Struggle Over Legitimacy, PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN
POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES, no. 2, Winter 2005, at 39. As
Colonel Watkin explains, there is a considerable amount of literature—including within M.
Pictet’s Commentary to the Geneva Conventions—concerning the precise meaning of the
requirement to have fixed, recognizable insignia. The question is quite knotty. Operationally,
“the capturing state has significant freedom to determine the status of detained personnel by
adopting a narrow interpretation of the criteria thereby making detainees, or a group of
opponents, unprivileged belligerents.” Id. at 30. Thus, the phenomenon I describe is not con-
fined to a discussion of the implications of a certain understanding of the Geneva Conven-
tions. Suffice it to say, however, that a lack of determinacy in this area cannot help but
exacerbate the problem.
162. The mechanism animating such discretion would not be derived from the Conven-
tions themselves. Presumably, this is premised on something like the VCLT’s material breach
standard. See VCLT, supra note 16, art. 60. Although some states (notably, the United R
States) are not parties to the VCLT, it is generally acknowledged that its provisions are
merely the codification of customary international law. U.S. Dep’t of State, Vienna Conven-
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ing a few postulates suggests that this is a standard heavily biased in favor
of states—and one that perhaps redounds to the benefit of only a few
states. First, states typically control a treasury sufficient to comply with
these kinds of requirements, whereas nonstate actors may not. Second,
states that are also significant military powers can be assumed to use some
form of covert military forces. Third, it has never been claimed that some
normal state has rendered itself ineligible for protection under the Geneva
Conventions by virtue of a failure to suppress covert acts that violate this
requirement, even where such acts result in death, capture, or injury. Thus,
some states can, as a matter of policy, engage in continual low-level viola-
tions of the Geneva Conventions to no effect,163 while singling out other
states or nonstate actors as having waived their rights under the Geneva
Conventions by virtue of their violations rising to some critical mass. This
is a hydra-headed problem only exacerbated by a vague standard with re-
spect to the duties of states to suppress (and, therefore, to eschew policies
permitting) nongrave breaches.
In sum, the fact that this area of IHL is so murky and poorly defined
has far-reaching implications for the regime as a whole. The emphatic lack
of clarity is not merely an academic enigma. Quite to the contrary, it sug-
gests stark limits on the scope of the Geneva Conventions generally and,
ultimately, on the effectiveness of the grave-breaches regime. In order to
preserve the integrity of that regime (or, perhaps, to achieve it), these im-
plications ought to be more thoroughly examined and better understood,
and they should be thoughtfully considered as states continue to build
upon the corpus of IHL. The Additional Protocols made some strides in
that direction, but they still failed to address the inexplicable disparity in
how states are expected to regulate conduct prohibited by the regime as a
whole. And this failure persists in obscuring the proper role of domestic
governments in implementing the norms of IHL.
CONCLUSION
There is a certain orderly beauty that is manifest in a conception of
law as hierarchical. The most general, most accepted, and most important
legal prescriptions are provided for in the highest stratum of legislation,
and the narrowest, most idiosyncratic, and most parochial in the lowest.
From this perspective, international law dwells at the summit of the struc-
ture, and all other strata reside below it. One need not push too hard on
this conception before encountering flaws in the design. Nevertheless,
there is a sense in which this is how law is ordered, from the global to the
local. The Geneva Conventions are unquestionably a part of that highest
tier, and their mandates map quite well onto our assumptions about the
.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2013) (“The United States considers many of the provisions of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to constitute customary international law on the
law of treaties.”).
163. It nearly goes without saying, but a policy of engaging in perfidy is, of course, a
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importance and universal character of rules promulgated as international
law. So it is puzzling that such a paradigmatic instantiation of that expecta-
tion does so little to clarify the duties of those subject to it with respect to
the greatest portion of its prohibitions. But that is the case.
At the heart of my thesis is not an appeal for reform of the Geneva
Conventions or a prescription for states parties in implementing the Con-
ventions’ requirements. Nor is it an attempt to suggest on normative
grounds a more appealing interpretation of the Geneva Conventions than
states parties have been inclined to adopt. I confess that I would happily
make these cases elsewhere. Rather, this Note is an effort to illuminate an
aspect of the Geneva Conventions that is radically undertheorized in light
of its thoroughly explored context. Further, I have sought here to describe
this facet of the regime as it relates to the divergence between the Geneva
Conventions and Additional Protocols envisaged by the commentators
and the ICRC on one hand, and the states parties themselves on the other.
And finally, it is an attempt to explicate the broader implications of that
divergence and the reality of state practice.
The current treatment in the literature of nongrave breaches suggests
that they add little of moment to the overall scheme of the Geneva Con-
ventions. One might take that to suggest that my concerns are a tempest in
a teapot. But I am drawn more to idioms that reflect the sometimes out-
sized impact of small features and phenomena, like “weakest link” or
“butterfly effect.” It must be admitted that the Geneva Conventions are
intended to be a single, coherent whole, and that they are thought of as
performing something akin to the function of a keystone in the IHL ca-
non. To the extent that we are persuaded by this organic understanding of
the Conventions and the IHL system, we should hesitate to dismiss any
anomaly as “simple” or “minor.”
